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Abstract:
The formation of the currency union reduces transaction costs thereby incresing
interregional trade links, changing the centrality of regions relative to other regions, and
increasing (price) competition between regions. Each of these lines of influence affects the
interregional division of labour, i.e., the industrial specialisation of regions. In an opposite
direction, industrial specialisation of regions itself may significantly affect the
susceptibility of regions to region-specific shocks, and the centre-periphery differential of
regional incomes. It is influenced considerably by the integration process, and it
determines what the results of this process on regions are. However, it is not yet clear what
exactly will be the results of EMU with respect to specialisation since theoretical
considerations (particularly on the base of the “new economic geography”) lead to rather
contradicting predictions and empirical evidence on the process of European integration so
far is sparse and inconclusive.2
 1. Introduction
The European Monetary Union (EMU) is a major institutional reform that substantially
changes all kinds of economic relations. Thus European regions are likely to be affected,
too. This raises the question whether all European regions will participate in the expected
welfare benefits to a similar degree. Potentially, the integration process could also render
an increased instability of regional development and rising divergence of regional incomes.
Hence, there might be winners and losers to the integration process.
This paper is to discuss the relationship of the creation of EMU and the division of labour
between European regions. It is likely to be a mutual relationship: On the one hand, EMU
will deeply influence the division of labour and, hence the location of industries in space
and the specialisation of regions. On the other hand, the way the division of labour is
organised in European space will at least partially decide on the effects EMU is going to
have on European regions. In section 2 of this paper I will explain why, in my view,
regional specialisation matters when assessing the likely regional effects of EMU. Section
3 contains a review of theoretical approaches for explaining industrial location and
regional specialisation. Section 4 reviews the empirical evidence which exists so far on
regional specialisation (including some preliminary own results). Section 5 concludes in
that it discusses some perspectives of EMU for European regions.
2. Regional specialisation— a clue determinant for EMU effects on
regions
The creation of the European Monetary Union results in two major effects: it eliminates the
possibility of adjusting national nominal exchange rates and it reduces transaction costs
connected to the existence of different currencies (i.e. costs of information, conversion and
hedging). These two effects exert several rather divergent influences on regional
employment and on regional incomes. However, analysing the divergent lines of influence
one finds the way regions are specialised on certain industries to be a clue determinant in
several of these. In order to prove this I would like to show, in a somewhat stylised way,
four major lines of influence (figure 1).
(1) Reduction of price flexibility: To start with, the abolition of national exchange rates by
reducing the possibilities of quick price responses on asymmetric shocks particularly
influences the performance of regional labour markets. Within the analytical framework of
the theory of optimal currency areas it is maintained that exchange rates are useful tools
for macroeconomics adjustment in the case of asymmetric shocks. Such shocks require a3
response of real exchange rates, either by adjusting nominal exchange rates or else by
adjusting nominal goods and factor prices. If nominal wages and prices are sticky and
factor mobility is low, the adjustment of nominal exchange rates may be crucial in order to
evade an increase of unemployment. Accordingly, a currency union reduces the
opportunities to react to shocks by adjusting exchange rates and this endangers the risk of
unemployment.
Figure 1  —  Effects of EMU on income and employment of European regions — four
major lines of influences
European Monetary Union
Abolition of exchange rate adjustment Reduction of transaction costs

















With EMU, of course, it is not the regions but the states that lose the possibility of nominal
exchange rate adjustments. However, this also reduces the capabilities of regions to react
to shocks, at least if seen in connection with the loss of autarky in the field of monetary
policy. For adjustments of the external nominal exchange rate can help changing internal
price relations: Suppose a large region of a country is hit by a severe asymmetric shock
(e.g., because of a depression in a branch on which the region is highly specialised) that
would require a decrease of goods and factor prices in this particular region. If wages and
prices are sticky downward and all other mechanisms of adjustment (e.g., factor mobility)
are also hampered, a way out would be the depreciation of the exchange rate of the
particular country and hence a real decrease of all wages and prices within that country. As4
a consequence, goods and factors prices in those parts that are not hit to a similar degree by
this shock are too low to be in equilibrium and increase. If due to a certain degree of
money illusion the real wage loss by the import-induced inflation in the shocked region is
not equalised, than relative prices and goods within the country have been changed by way
of a nominal exchange rate depreciation.
To put it more broadly: in countries with few flexibility grades and rather divergent
regional structures, another monetary and exchange rate policy might be useful than in
quite flexible and homogenous countries. A certain degree of inflation may in the former
countries help overcoming the downward  flexibility constraints – though only as long as a
certain degree of money illusion persists (cf. Mauro, Prasad, Spilimbergo 1999). The
inversion of this conclusion yields that the loss of monetary and exchange rate autarky may
duly put additional strain on the need to enhance labour market flexibility in general and,
more specifically, on regional labour markets, too.1
(2) Change of labour market flexibility:  This leads to a second line of influence: The
additional strain put forward by EMU may foster changes of European labour markets on
the national as well as on the regional level. Up to now, in preparing for EMU, steps in
opposing directions have been taken by the European administration and governments of
the member states. On the one hand, some efforts, particularly on the European level, tend
to stifle competition. By claiming the need of a ‘social dimension’ of EMU in order to
protect European workers against ‘unfair’ competition and ‘wage dumping’, the EU opted
for European minimum standards for working conditions. Thereby, the capabilities of
regions to absorb asymmetric shocks without an increase of unemployment have been
reduced. On the other hand, the national governments of the member states have, at rather
different scope, taken measures to deregulate and decentralise their labour markets, e.g., by
a reduction in the stringency of collective wage agreements, and by increasing working
time flexibility. Although up to now, in most countries, these attempts at reforming labour
market institutions have been rather half-hearted, future progress in this field may spur
regional labour market flexibility and increase the shock absorbing capabilities. This would
                                                       
1  Looking  for support for these theses, one finds some studies that underline the regional differentiated
effects of exchange rate and monetary policies. Thus, Carlino and DeFina (1998) and Ramaswamy and
Sloek (1997) have found monetary policy by itself to create asymmetric shocks to the regions of the
currency area concerned, as it is not neutral in its effects. Also, Carlino, Cody, Voith (1990) and Milton
(1994) calculated the exchange rate susceptibility of regions finding  a severe impact of exchange rate
changes on regional growth rates and export performances. An observation of the OECD Economic
Survey (1989/90) that depreciations resulted in greater real income losses for Italy’ s Mezzogiorno than
for its North, due to the South’s low export propensitiy and high import dependency, does not contradict
the above argument. These income losses may have been necessary in order to avoid an even lower
export rate or higher import rate and thereby even larger unemployment.5
particularly be true, if an increase of institutional variety within national employment
systems would allow for more appropriate reactions on region-specific shocks.
In fact, the significance of regional non-adjustment for the explanation even of current
regional unemployment in Europe has been stressed repeatedly (more recently by Adam
1996, Obstfeld and Peri 1998, Dohse, Krieger-Boden, and Soltwedel 1999).2 A major
feature is that wage policy at large is not region-specific; productivity growth in the
prosperous regions creates opportunities for wage increases which are copied by the less
successful regions raising their unit labour costs. Moreover, institutions such as welfare
and unemployment benefit systems, minimum wages, dismissal protection laws, working-
hour regulations, even regulations on shopping hours, are mostly shaped at the national
level and are usually uniform within a given country. Hence, they produce the same side-
costs of labour in all regions irrespective of different regional records of labour
productivity. In EMU, due to the loss of monetary and exchange rate autarky (see above
influence line 1), the need for an adjustment at regional labour markets in the case of
asymmetric shocks becomes even more urgent. Whether a broader regional diversity of
labour market institutions can be achieved (e.g., by opt-out clauses to nation-wide
regulations or by a decentralisation of institutions and institutional competition) or whether
pressures toward greater Europe-wide uniformity of labour market institutions will
succeed, is thus of major significance for the future evolution of regional unemployment.
(3) Increase of trade linkages: Turning to the effects of the reduction of transaction costs
by EMU, a third line of influence on regions may be sketched. As EMU reduces the
number of currencies it decreases transaction costs within the area concerned. This
decrease reduces the economic distances between regions and is likely to influence deeply
the extent and the direction of trade flows. There is no doubt in academic discussions that
trade between EMU member states will be intensified furthermore. By this process, the
symmetry of shocks between regions may rise: any shock that will hit a certain region or
country will be passed on to all other regions and countries much more quickly than before
by way of increased backward and forward trade linkages. This could contribute to a
synchronisation of regional business cycles within EMU (Frankel and Rose 1998). The
regional susceptibility to asymmetric shocks would decline, no enhancement of regional
shock absorption capabilities would be needed, and a Europe-wide reaction on shocks
would suffice to offset adverse effects on (regional) employment. If this would prove true,
the criterions of the theory of optimum currency areas would depend on the accomplished
                                                       
2  The most elucidating examples to this respect are East Germany and the Italian Mezzogiorno. In both
cases, the devastating high unemployment rates of the problem regions compared to other parts of the
country are not reflected in a correspondingly differentiated wage structure.6
state of integration (i.e. be endogenous) and the monetary union would create its own
success.
Yet, there are still further effects to be considered. The intensification of trade has
implications on the regional division of labour. On the one hand, integration reduces the
degree of autarky of each country involved in the process, as it increases the number of
suppliers for each specific good, an aspect that has been stressed particularly in the older
literature on integration in the tradition of Schumpeter. Thereby, monopolistic or
oligopolistic markets become less likely, the price competition increases, the efficiency of
the production process rises, output increases, and the opportunities for gaining producer’s
rents are reduced. By this increased competition, the location of industries and the regional
specilisation is affected, and regional incomes may rise. What is more, integration impels
producers to force innovations in order to avoid the increasing price competition, and
hence even spurs the growth rate of regional incomes. As can be drawn from the “theory of
endogenous growth”, this process is supported by the increase of efficiency in the R&D
sector (e.g. by the avoidance of redundancy) which makes a higher innovation rate
attainable. On the other hand, the general increase of trade links will render possible to
take advantage of scale economies which once more affects the regional division of labour
and the specialisation of regions. As the “new economic geography” suggests, a reduction
of transaction costs changes the location of industries, yielding concentration and/or
deconcentration processes of certain industries. The degree of industrial specialisation of
regions, however, influences  their shock susceptibility: The more specialised a region is
on a specific branch, the more it is hit by sector-specific shocks of this very branch. Thus,
if EMU leads to an increase of specialisation of regions, as for instance Krugman (1993)
thinks, this may impede cet. par. the record of regional employment. By contrast, an
increase of diversification of the regions within EMU, which is expected for instance by
Emerson et al. (1990) and Frankel and Rose (1998), may improve it. Moreover, the kind of
industrial specialisation of a region also influences the regional income, since different
industrial branches in a world of non-homogenous products and oligopolistic markets offer
different opportunities of gaining income.
(4) Change of regional centrality: In this process of re-arranging the location of industries
and the specialisation of regions, each specific region will have to find its specific place,
and much will depend on where this region is situated geographically: As the inner borders
within EMU loose significance, some regions that are situated at the periphery of their
respective countries but at the centre of EMU may gain centrality, i.e. the capability to take
advantage of scale economies. Other regions situated at the utmost periphery at external7
borders of EMU ought to have less good prospects and may  thus loose centrality,
particularly such regions that had been central within their former economic entities.
Having sketched out these four lines of influence of EMU on European regions, it has to be
underlined that this, of course, is no complete list of influences. For instance, political
interventions also are likely to play a role. Thus we observe a broad discussion on the need
of mew accommodating stability funds (Sachs and Sala-i-Martin 1991, Obstfeld and Peri
1997, von Hagen and Hammond 1998, Belke and Gros 1998) as well as on the need to
increase the existing structural funds in order to achieve more cohesion between European
regions. We will not go into this discussion here.
Summarising this chapter on the regional effects of EMU on European regions, we find
that in the aftermath of EMU regional employment is decisively influenced by the change
of the regions exposure to asymmetric shocks and by their capability to cope with these
shocks. To some degree but not exclusively regional employment is thereby dependent on
the way industrial specialisation of the regions changes. More directly, the change of
industrial specialisation decides on regional incomes which are, however, also influenced
by the regional employment record. The industrial specialisation of regions is hence of
major significance in the process of integration for regional employment as well as for
regional incomes. It is influenced considerably by the integration process, and it
determines what the results of this process on regions are. Yet, these relations are by no
means simple and linear ones. It seems thus much worthwhile, to get a deeper insight in the
factors and mechanisms that shape the industrial specialisation of regions.
3. Regional specialisation — what the ‘new economic geography’ tells
about it
The theoretical back-ground to considerations on the industrial specialisation of regions is
prepared by various strands of theory, e.g., neo-classical trade theory with its comparative
advantage approach in the tradition of Ricardo, Heckscher, Ohlin, and Samuelson, location
economics in the tradition of von Thünen, Weber, Lösch, and Isard, and polarisation
theories in the tradition of Perroux, Myrdal, Hirschman, and Kaldor. Moreover, in recent
years the so-called new economic geography emerged, linking items of these traditional
theories to those of new trade theory. NEG takes interest in the location of industries in
space, and more particularly in agglomeration and de-agglomeration processes. As
characteristic innovations, NEG takes into consideration scale economies, inhomogeneity
of products, and, hence, incomplete markets, transportation or transaction costs, factor
mobility and, hence, endogeneity of factor endowments. In the models of NEG, the8
regional division of labour and the industrial specialisation of regions is the result of
locational decisions. Mobile factors choose their location according to existing centripetal
and centrifugal forces (table 1).
The centripetal forces work toward an agglomeration of factors in few economic centres
driving a circular cumulative process by which agglomeration tends to get self-reinforcing.
They are closely connected to the existence of scale economies and inhomogenuous
products. Thus one may distinguish
-  technical increasing returns to scale internal to a firm (e.g., due to a degression of fixed
costs),
-  economies of localisation external to a firm but internal to a certain industry (forward
and backward linkages such as a large industry-specific market, proximity to important
industry-specific suppliers, supply of specific labour qualifications, or specific
knowledge spillovers),
-  economies of urbanisation that are purely external (e.g., more general information and
knowledge spillovers),
-  home market effects and price index effects that are particularly important to NEG
models, and that will be explained instantaneously.
Table 1 — Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the new economic geography
Centripetal forces Centrifugal forces
Technical scale economies (internal to a firm) Immobile factors
Localisation economies (internal to an industry) Congestion costs
Urbanisation economies (purely external)
Home market effect Price competition effect
Price index effect
Source: Krugman (1998), own compilation.
By contrast, the centrifugal forces that increase as agglomeration increases act toward a de-
agglomeration of factors. Such forces are
-  immobile factors whose prices increase as they get increasingly scarce (e.g., ground,
sometimes labour),
-  congestion costs (e.g., air congestion, sticky traffic, high criminal rates),
-  competition effects that are also particularly important to NEG models.9
The relationship between centripetal and centrifugal forces is not fixed. Rather, it changes,
as the degree of integration increases, or, what is assumed to be the same, as transaction
costs decrease. In order to see how the balance of these forces changes in the process of
integration it is useful to have a closer look on the mechanism of NEG models (for an
excellent survey see Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999).
NEG models are general equilibrium models without “loose ends”, hence we have goods
and labour markets, utility and production functions, incomes, prices, and wages, and
conditions on equilibrium. Generally, NEG models assume an economy with two
production sectors. The so-called agricultural sector produces one homogenous product
with a constant-returns technology on a perfectly competitive market, and the so-called
manufacturing sector produces a large variety of non-homogenous products with an
increasing returns technology. Due to this IRS technology, each variety is produced
exclusively at one location. Concerning goods markets, NEG models usually build on the
work of  Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) considering a two stages utility function (choice between
the agricultural and the manufacturing product / choice between the different varieties of
the manufacturing good) and assuming a love for variety of consumers. Transport costs
take the form of iceberg costs. Usually, two factors are taken into consideration, one
immobile factor called “farmers” producing the homogenous good, and one mobile factor
called “workers” producing the manufacturing good. Theses factors get all income
associated to production as profits are excluded. The latter mobile factor is assumed to be
the engine of any agglomeration process: due to migrations of this factor, the factor
endowment of the destination region is improved which increases its attraction as a
location for other manufacturing activities which once more leads to in-migration of
workers driving a circular cumulative process.3 Yet, agglomeration only takes place, if the
centripetal forces are not outweighed or superimposed by the centrifugal forces.
Decisive to the agglomeration process are real wage differentials between regions that
determine the migration decision of workers in the NEG world: Workers migrate to the
region with the highest real wage. Real wages in a region, however, depend on the scale of
the region’s manufacturing sector and on the general level of transport costs in a positive
as well as in a negative direction:
                                                       
3  Some NEG models assume other engines of agglomeration, e.g., migration of firms instead of workers
(Venables 1996, Markusen and Venables 1999), or factor accumulation due to endogenous growth.10
-  The higher a region’s share of the manufacturing sector is, the higher are the sales on
the home market that can be obtained without any loss to transport costs, and, hence, the
higher are its nominal wages and its real wages, too (home market effect, centripetal).
-  The higher a region’s share of the manufacturing sector is, the more of its consumption
goods originate from the region itself without having to bear any loss to transport costs,
the lower is thus its price index and the higher its real wages (price index effect,
centripetal).
-  The higher a region’s share of the manufacturing sector is, however, — and  the lower
thus its price index —, the higher is the price competition in the region exerting
pressure on the level of wages, too, and the lower are hence real wages (price
competition effect, centrifugal).
All three effects are the less significant the lower the level of transport costs is. The degree
to which these three effects depend on transport costs diverges and depends on the
significance of the manufacturing sector as compared to the agricultural sector as well as
on the elasticity of substitution between the manufacturing varieties. If we then consider
the transport costs to change due to an integration process, the stationary NEG models
become dynamic and describe agglomeration as well as de-agglomeration (figure 2a):
Figure 2a — Centrifugal and centripetal forces at different levels of transport costs
Manufacturing share











Source: Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1999)11
Figure 2b — Evolution path with increasing integration — the U-curve
Manufacturing share














Source: Fujita, Krugman, Venables (1999)-. Ottaviano and Puga (1997)
With transport costs being really high, the competition effect proves to be extremely
significant superimposing both other effects. In this case, we get a stable spatial
equilibrium, i.e., the symmetric solution where both regions are endowed equally with
workers and manufacturing firms. With the transport costs achieving a medium level, the
symmetric equilibrium gets instable, and we get two other stable equilibria with extreme
solutions: all workers and firms either concentrated in region 1 or region 2. Finally, with
transport costs approaching zero (or with including further centrifugal forces into the
model), the outcome may once more be the symmetric solution. In-between, we find two
transition zones with five equilibria, three stable and two instable.
Following an evolution that is characterised by increasing integration / decreasing transport
costs (figure 2 b), we would start with an autarky situation where manufacturing products
are produced symmetricly in both regions. When moving to a situation with medium
transport costs the centripetal forces would prevail driving an agglomeration process
toward one of the extreme solutions where all manufacturing takes place in just one region.
By this process, a core-periphery divide would emerge with the economic centre or core12
region getting specialised in the manufacturing sector, i.e., the increasing returns sector
with monopolistic competition and high income potential, and the other, peripheral region
getting specialised in what is left, the agricultural sector, i.e., the constant returns sector
with perfect competition and low income potential (figure 3). Moving on with integration
toward a situation with low transportation costs, the centrifugal forces would become more
and more predominant signalling the turn to a process of de-agglomeration (see, e.g.,
Krugman and Venables 1995).4


































If one takes into consideration two different varieties of the manufacturing good, the
analysis becomes more differentiated (figure 4). As in the former case, in a state of autarky
with very high transport costs each region produces each good and each variety in a
symmetric way, and in a state of extreme concentration at a medium level of transport
costs all manufacturing takes place in just one region raising regional specialisation
dramatically. However, if we move on to a state with very low transport costs, there is no
return to the symmetric solution, instead we find each region getting specialised in one
                                                       
4  Dluhosch (2000) stresses the significance of such centrifugal forces, most particularly the influence of
competition. Growing competition due to integration may act toward an increasing split of production
into components which may be manufactured at various scattered locations. Hence, integration may not
“per se promote a centre-periphery pattern” but rather “provide the opportunity to reap the benefits of a
finer (vertical) division of labour which can be shared among trading partners.” (p. 158)13
variety of the manufacturing good. By this location of industries, it is possible to take
advantage of scale economies, most particularly of those that are inherent to a firm or a
branch, whereas the centrifugal forces, particularly the price competition effect and the
effect resulting from the competititon for immobile factors, are eased to a certain degree.
To put it more broadly, the theoretical story of regional specialisation becomes the more
complex the more regions and the more industries are included, particularly if their
production technologies differ with respect to returns to scale. Accordingly, the described
process of agglomeration and de-agglomeration does not affect all these industries to the
same degree. Thus, the specific industry mix in the regions and, hence, the degree and
nature of specialisation of regions will change in the course of integration. First, industries
with high increasing returns will start moving from the periphery to the core. Others with
lower


















































increasing returns will follow later when transportation costs have declined a bit further.
Constant returns-industries will simply stay where they are. As transport costs decline from
a medium to a low level, the increasing returns industries will relocate to regions with low
production costs i.e. the peripheral regions. By this process, the increasing returns14
industries will tend to develop clusters, each at only few locations, instead of becoming
dispersed evenly. More specifically, these clusters may refer to certain varieties of a good
rather than to different branches. Hence, many regions will then dispose of some of these
industries and will be able to take advantage of their income potential. Still, the regional
specialisation may increase (Ottaviano and Puga 1997, Puga 1999), at least if observed at
the level of varieties.5
To complete the view on regional specialisation, it has to be stressed that, of course,
location decisions are taken in an interaction between such agglomeration-inducing forces
outlined in NEG and traditional natural and comparative advantages outlined in Ricardian,
and Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson models,6 and it cannot be stated ex ante which of these
influences may dominate the other. Comparative advantages are of specific relevance if
regions are considerably heterogenous with respect to factor endowments (refering to
immobile factors), if industries with a constant returns to scale technology predominate,
and if the degree of integration is high.
From these theoretical considerations, it becomes quite evident that regional specialisation,
according to its specific nature, may exert different influences on the evolution of the
regions: An increasing specialisation of some regions on industries with high increasing
returns will lead to an increase of their respective regional income, whereas the
specialisation of other regions on constant returns-industries will offer them no potential
for income growth. Also, other specific chararcteristics of the industries on which a region
is specialised, may influence the income potentials of the region. The OECD (1987), for
instance, distinguishes five categories of industries: scale-intensive industries, science-
based industries, industries producing differentiated goods, labour-intensive industries, and
resource-intensive industries. Each of these categories may offer the regions in which they
are located quite divergent perspectives with respect to income and growth
4. Regional specialisation — facts and figures for European regions
Reconsidering the relationship between the creation of EMU and regional specialisation as
outlined in section 2 of this paper, the question occurs whether specialisation really is as
important as has been argued. In the literature, there are several studies on the growing
                                                       
5  It has to be considered, that an increasing regional specialisation at the level of varieties may look like
decreasing specialisation /increasing diversification at the level of industries. So, the observation of an
increase or decrease of regional specialisation may depend on the sectoral breakdown chosen for the
observation.
6 In NEG models, in general, space is assumed to be homogenous.15
synchronization of business cycles as a result of growing trade relations and closer
exchange rate regimes. They seem to suggest that any shocks which hit a country are
passed on to other countries much more quickly due to growing forward and backward
trade linkages. Frankel and Rose (1998) estimated for OECD countries (including EU
member states, USA, Canada and Japan) that the closer trade links grew in the course of
time the more synchronized were the business cycles of the countries under consideration.
Artis and Zhang (1997 and 1999) analysed the correlation of OECD countries’ business
cycles with the US and the German business cycle, respectively. They found that for
European countries the correlation was particularly higher to the German than to the US
cycle after the European Monetary System had been erected. All these studies do not cover
the regional level. Yet, as trade linkages are likely to be even more important on a regional
than on a national level, the above findings should all the more apply for regions. These
investigations may cast some doubts on the significance of regional specialisation for
regional shock susceptibility and, hence, on the significance of its influence on regional
employment, even though they do not prove regional specialisation to be irrelevant.7
There is much less doubt on the role regional specialisation plays for regional income.
However, there is a severe lack of empirical evidence on this topic. Compared to the
increasingly sophisticated theoretical approaches of NEG (with differing outcomes
dependent on the model chosen and its specific assumptions) empirical analysis is lacking.
This applies for econometric tests on the relevance of NEG models8 as well as for more
general investigations on the evoulution of specialisation in the course of integration. And
this applies even for the case of Western Europe, although the West European integration
process as an economic experiment without precedent in modern economic history offers a
promising field of research. The creation of EMU, to this respect, may be accounted as
another step of increasing integration.
Most investigations on specialisation in Europe refer to the national level and study in
particular the manufacturing sector. According to these investigations, overall
specialisation of EU member states seems to have increased in the 1970s and 1980s,
starting from a remarkably low level at the end of the 1960s as compared to US states
(Hufbauer and Chilas 1974, Molle and Boeckhout 1995, Amiti 1999, Brülhart 1998, Walz
                                                       
7  Specialisation is not taken into consideration in these estimates, so one cannot exclude that the
synchronisation of business cycles was the result of decreasing specialisation. However, as other results
(see below) show that specialisation rather increased than decreased, this explanation does not look very
convincing.
8  See, however,  the work by Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999) who tested the relevance of home market
effects and found them to be significant in the case of  (Japanese) regions, but not in the case of (OECD-)
countries.16
1999). A comprehensive new study on country specialisation and industrial location, also,
finds an overall increase of specialisation and concentration of industries since the 1980s,
though at a very slow pace, and as the result of quite divergent processes, some acting
toward concentration others toward dispersion of industries (Middelfart-Knarvig, K.H.,
H.G. Overman, S.J. Redding, and A.J. Venables 2000). Some own estimates reveal even
more ambiguity, particularly with respect to the 1990s (figure 5). The EU Commission, so
far, maintains that the European integration process has led to only few changes in the
degree of specialisation of member states, and to a steady, yet very slow catching-up of the
low-income states.9











































































































Brülhart (1998) also revealed that increasing returns industries tend to be higly localised
(which he concludes from the observation of low intra-industry trade between these
industries).11 By contrast, some labour-intensive industries are still much more evenly
                                                       
9   See the Commission’s reports on Europe 2000+, on cohesion in the EU, on the socio-economic situation
of EU regions, and on the competitiveness of  European industry  (EU-Commission 1995, 1996, 1999a,
1999b).
10  sa b ii
i
n
=- å , where ai are industrial shares of the economy under investigation, and bi are industrial
shares of a reference economy, and where 02 ££ s .
11 In order to classify industries with respect to the scale of their returns Brülhart followed the classification
scheme by Pratten (1988). A number of studies analyse the characteristics of industries with respect to the
relevance of scale economies applying methods either on the measurement of economies of scale within
industries (e.g., Pratten 1988, Oliveira Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat 1996) or on the degree of localisation17
dispersed across European countries. This,  however, according to Brülhart, may simply
reflect a delayed process of agglomeration and localisation in these sectors. Brülhart
concludes that industries with high increasing returns tend to agglomerate even at a still
low degree of integration, whereas industries with lower increasing returns start entering a
process of agglomeration at a much higher degree of integration.
Regarding the evolution of specialisation on a regional level, there is still a severe lack of
empirical results which is primarily due to a lack of data on European regions, particularly
on the spatial division of labour and the location of industries in a sufficiently
disaggregated regional and industrial break-down, and covering a sufficient number of
years. Hence, Helg et al (1995) and de Nardis et al (1996) determine that European regions
are much more specialised on few industries than EU member states (and therefore are
more explicitly affected by asymmetric shocks) but they do not analyse the change of this
pattern in the course of the integration process. Molle (1980),  Brülhart (1998), and Walz
(1999) find for the 1970s and 1980s, respectively, that the manufacturing sector as a whole
became more localised which may indicate an increase of regional specialisation. Krieger,
Thoroe and Weskamp (1985), Waniek (1995), and Brülhart (1998) reveal for the 1970s
and 1980s, respectively, that, simultanoeusly, the concentration of the manufacturing
sector at existing agglomeration centres diminished. Also, Bode (1999), in an analysis of
West Germany, found a trend toward deconcentration. One may conclude, that the
manufacturing sector seems to have withdrawn from the centres toward the periphery
though not in a process of dispersion but rather by creation of new manufacturing centres.
However, these investigations refer to the manufacturing sector as a whole. They need to
be supplemented by more detailed analyses of regional specialisation within the
manufacturing sector, and, also, within the services sector. A first effort into this direction
has been submitted by Hallet (2000). He finds regional specialisation to have been
decreasing since the 1980s (which admittedly may be due to a statistical bias arising from
an insufficient sectoral break-down of the data base12). Like Middelfart-Knarvik et al.
(2000), he finds any process of concentration of industries to be very slow. Hence, these
results stress the need to analyse regional specialisation for even longer time periods,
covering two or more decades, and with an even more detailed industrial break-down.
                                                                                                                                                                       
(e.g., Ellison, Glaeser 1997, particularly for France see Maurel and Sédillot 1999). For an overview see
Junius 1999.
12 Hallet (2000) used existing data by Eurostat which are broken down into 17 sectors, including agriculture,
9 industrial branches, and 5 service branches.18
To appropriately analyse the spatial division of labour and the location of industries,
however, requires to take recourse to nationally available data for EU member states, since
no such data set at the European regional level exists that is internationally comparable.
Therefore, we started a project of collecting and exploiting such data at least for a number
of selected countries. So far, we have employment figures for France for some selected
years from 1973 to 1996 broken down into 21 regions and 30 manufacturing branches.
Thereupon, Herfindahl indices have been calculated which compare a given regional
structure to a situation where all industries have equal shares (figure 6). By this figures, we
find that most regions over a period of more than 20 years show almost no variation at all
with respect to specialisation (whereas some regions exhibit an evolution which may be
taken as an inverted u-curve). However, calculating Gini indices which refer to the
similarity of a regions’ structure to the average structure of France as a whole, reveals
another picture (figure 7): according to these figures, specialisation in most regions seems
to have decreased, particularly in regions which had been most specialised in the early
1970s. We may conclude, that these Gini indices do not so much indicate a decrease of
regional specialisation but rather an increase of the specialisation of France as a whole, and
such a result is in line with the results quoted above on the specialisation of EU member
states. At any rate, much more research on this topic is needed in order to get more clear-
cut results, and to find out whether a certain general pattern of specialisation in the course
of increasing integration can be detected.
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To this respect, it will also become even more important to analyse in-depth the nature of
the regional specialisation. To know that regions are highly specialised does not tell all.
Regions may be specialised on industries with increasing returns technology, e.g.,
information technology industries, or, due to natural advantages, on industries with
localised inputs, e.g., mining, iron and steel industry, or simply on what is left, industries
with constant returns technology, e.g., food production, textiles, and it is sure to make a
difference with respect to regional income and growth, on which of these industries the
region is specialised. Information on the nature of regional specialisation given, it may
then be possible to analyse the relation between specialisation and regional income. New
                                                       
14 Based on locational coefficients.20
promising methods have been developed transforming the well-known shift-share-analysis
(e.g., Garcia-Mila and McGuire 1993, Esteban 2000, Möller and Tassinopoulos 2000).
5. Conclusions: Regional specialisation in Euroland
A major conclusion of this paper is that on the potential regional effects of EMU as another
step within the process of European integration there are much more questions than
reliable answers. Cum grano salis, it may be stated:
-  The overall benefit to EMU will be highly positive, due particularly to an enhanced
exploitation of scale economies and a spurred competition that increases efficiency.
-  The division of labour between regions in Euroland is likely to change, though perhaps
at a slow pace which aggravates distinguishing between the effects of the various
progressive integration steps in the EU (e.g., enlargements, completion of the Single
Market, EMU). Taking together the theoretical considerations and the sparse empirical
evidence, it seems a bit more probable that the specialisation of regions may increase
rather than decrease.
-  Such an overall outcome, however, will most likely be the result of rather divergent
evolutions: Some increasing returns industries that have been higly concentrated in
European central regions seem to deconcentrate by withdrawing from these centres and
forming new clusters in more peripheral regions. Some labour-intensive industries that
have been located rather dispersed so far, seemingly tend to form clusters, too. The
centres seem to become attractive for entirely new activities with high scale economies
(e.g., localisation economies), particularly in the field of services.
-  With respect to regional susceptibility to asymmetric shocks, the outcome is open to
question: While regional specialisation seemingly increases thus making asymmetric
shocks at a regional level more likely, the speed of passing shocks from one region to
another by way of trade linkages increases, too, acting toward a synchronisation of
regional business cycles.
-  With respect to effects of EMU on regional income perspectives the outcome is
ambigious, too:  While on the one hand, some IRS industries get more scattered across
space thus improving the income potential of peripheral regions, others get more
concentrated.
With a sufficiently detailed data set on European regions, and with investigations, on the
one hand, on the relation between increasing integration and the degree and nature of
regional specialisation, and, on the other hand, the relation between the degree and nature21
of regional specialisation and regional income, we hope to be able to provide some more
explicit answers on regional specialisation and on the potential winners and losers in
Euroland.22
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